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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE SCALIA

BRADFORD R. CLARK*

I. INTRODUCTION
Commentators generally regard federalism and separation of powers as
distinct features of the constitutional structure. In reality, these doctrines were
designed to work together to further the same goals: to avoid tyranny and to
preserve individual liberty.
Professor Thomas Merrill overlooks this
connection in his attempt to explain the Supreme Court’s decision making
process under Chief Justice William Rehnquist.1 Professor Merrill maintains
that there have been two Rehnquist Courts: one from 1986 to 1994, and
another from 1994 to the present. In Professor Merrill’s view, the first
Rehnquist Court focused on social issues—such as abortion, affirmative action,
and school prayer—with “relatively few important doctrinal innovations in
these areas.”2 The second Rehnquist Court, by contrast, focused on
“constitutional federalism, including the scope of federal power under the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Tenth
Amendment limitations on federal power, and state sovereign immunity from
private lawsuits reflected in the Eleventh Amendment.”3 Unlike the first
Rehnquist Court, the second “has generated a number of important
innovations.”4
Professor Merrill considers four hypotheses about judicial behavior in an
attempt to explain these differences, including what he calls “the internal
strategic actor hypothesis.”5 Applying this hypothesis, Professor Merrill
suggests that Justice Antonin Scalia made a strategic choice to shift his

* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. I thank Bill Kelley, John
Manning, and Jon Molot for insightful comments and suggestions. I also thank John Kammerer
and Brian Wesoloski for excellent research assistance.
1. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003).
2. Id. at 570.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 572.
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priorities from social issues to constitutional federalism circa 1994.6 This
hypothesis is unpersuasive. As Professor Merrill acknowledges, Justice
“Scalia had little occasion to consider questions of constitutional federalism
before he was appointed to the Supreme Court.”7 Thus, it is not surprising that
Justice Scalia did not arrive on the Court with a full-fledged federalism agenda
or that he preferred to wait for briefing and argument before reaffirming an
important precedent like Hans v. Louisiana.8 From the beginning, however,
Justice Scalia has been a strong proponent of constitutional federalism. In fact,
with only one arguable exception,9 Justice Scalia has voted to uphold the
constitutional prerogatives of the states in every major federalism case decided
since he joined the Court.
Professor Merrill presents a variety of “circumstantial evidence” to support
his thesis that Justice Scalia made a strategic choice to favor federalism in
1994.10 None of this evidence, however, withstands analysis. In fact, much of
the evidence that Professor Merrill presents actually undercuts his hypothesis
and confirms Justice Scalia’s long-standing commitment to constitutional
federalism. In the end, Professor Merrill fails to marshal any persuasive
evidence to support his claim.
Justice Scalia does appear to have an “agenda” of sorts in federalism cases,
although not the one that Professor Merrill suggests. Justice Scalia’s goal in
these cases is to uphold the original constitutional structure in order to respect
the Founders’ constitutional design and to protect individual liberty. Professor
Merrill acknowledges Justice Scalia’s interest in the constitutional separation
of powers,11 but fails to recognize the connection between separation of
powers and federalism. Neither feature of the constitutional structure was
meant to be an end in itself. Rather, both separation of powers and federalism
were designed to check government power and to secure individual liberty. As
James Madison explained in urging ratification, because the Constitution both
divides and separates power, “a double security arises to the rights of the
people.”12 Thus, even though Justice “Scalia had little occasion to consider
questions of constitutional federalism before he was appointed to the Supreme
Court,”13 it is not surprising that he quickly came to regard federalism—like
separation of powers—as an essential element of the Founders’ constitutional
design.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See Merrill, supra note 1, at 601-20.
Id. at 609.
134 U.S. 1 (1890). See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
Merrill, supra note 1, at 609-17.
Id. at 604.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Merrill, supra note 1, at 609.
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II. MERRILL’S EVIDENCE
Professor Merrill produces no persuasive evidence to support his claim that
“Justice Scalia has behaved strategically in seeking to influence the entire
course of the Rehnquist Court over the last eight years.”14 Professor Merrill
relies exclusively on “circumstantial evidence” to support his hypothesis.15
Upon analysis, however, that evidence not only fails to support, but generally
tends to refute, Professor Merrill’s account.
First, Professor Merrill finds that nothing in Justice Scalia’s background
suggests an orientation favoring “devolution of power from the federal
government to the states.”16 Specifically, Professor Merrill notes that Justice
Scalia’s “entire professional career had been in federal service or in teaching
federal administrative law at national law schools.”17 The mere fact, however,
that Justice Scalia had few occasions to consider federalism questions before
joining the Supreme Court yields no evidence—circumstantial or otherwise—
of his views on the topic. Similarly, the fact that then-Professor Scalia’s
scholarly interests lay elsewhere provides no basis for predicting how he would
later rule on federalism questions as a judge sworn to uphold the Constitution.
Second, Professor Merrill notes that Justice Scalia considered the question
of federal sovereign immunity early in his academic career, and recognized
that the doctrine “has little claim either to historical legitimacy or practical
efficacy.”18 According to Professor Merrill, “[s]omeone harboring these views
about federal sovereign immunity would be unlikely to give an unqualified
endorsement to state sovereign immunity.”19 The very article that Professor
Merrill cites, however, draws a sharp distinction between the legitimacy of
federal and state sovereign immunity by differentiating “‘domestic’ and
‘foreign’ sovereign immunity.”20 According to Professor Scalia, “foreign”
immunity provides “exemption from the compulsory process of another
sovereign,” whereas “domestic” immunity refers to “exemption of the state’s
executive or legislative branches from the compulsory process of its own
judiciary.”21 Thus, as Professor Scalia explained, the “eleventh amendment to
the Constitution embodies only that ‘foreign’ immunity, protecting the states
from being sued before federal tribunals by citizens of other states or

14. Id. at 604.
15. Id. at 609-17.
16. Id. at 609.
17. Id.
18. Merrill, supra note 1, at 610.
19. Id.
20. Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Some Conclusions From the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867, 886 (1970).
21. Id.
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nations.”22 The federal government, by contrast, has only “domestic”
immunity from suit in federal court.
It is true, as Professor Merrill suggests, that Professor Scalia was critical of
federal sovereign immunity. Such criticism, however, contrasts sharply with
Professor Scalia’s apparent willingness to embrace broad state sovereign
immunity under the Constitution. For example, Professor Scalia criticized the
Supreme Court’s early practice of restricting Eleventh Amendment immunity
to cases in which the state itself was the party of record. According to
Professor Scalia, “[i]t eventually and inevitably became clear that the ‘party of
record’ test . . . could not continue to be applied to the eleventh-amendment
cases without flouting the clear intent of the Constitution.”23 Professor
Scalia’s only lament was that this necessary expansion of state immunity
spread to federal immunity as well. Thus, Professor Scalia complained that,
during the nineteenth century, “the Supreme Court treated cases arising under
the eleventh amendment as involving essentially the same issue as those cases
which dealt with the ‘domestic’ immunity of the United States itself.”24
“Consequently,” Professor Scalia explained, “a change made to protect the
states from the federal courts, as the Constitution required, had the very
different effect of insulating the federal government from the federal courts,
thereby casting a shadow upon the entire field of nonstatutory review.”25
These observations reveal that, as early as 1970, Professor Scalia believed that
state sovereign immunity had a greater claim to constitutional legitimacy than
federal sovereign immunity.26
Third, Professor Merrill examines “Justice Scalia’s pre-judicial attitude”
with respect to “the more general topic of federalism.”27 Specifically, Merrill
discusses a four-page speech that Professor Scalia delivered to the Federalist
Society in 1982.28 Professor Scalia cautioned those in attendance against
“generalized hostility towards national law which has become a common
feature of conservative thought.”29 Professor Merrill apparently (mis)reads
this speech as hostile to constitutional federalism and treats it as circumstantial
evidence of Justice Scalia’s subsequent strategic behavior on the Supreme
Court. Professor Scalia, however, actually endorsed a broad vision of
federalism, properly understood. He explained:

22. Id.
23. Id. at 887.
24. Id. at 886.
25. Scalia, supra note 20, at 888 (emphasis added).
26. See Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1, 35 (2003) (discussing Professor Scalia’s view that state sovereign immunity corresponds
to foreign state immunity under the law of nations).
27. Merrill, supra note 1, at 610.
28. Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 19 (1982).
29. Id. at 20.
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In meeting to discuss federalism, we have to bear in mind that it is a form of
government midway between two extremes. At one extreme, the autonomy,
the disunity, the conflict of independent states; at the other, the uniformity, the
inflexibility, the monotony of one centralized government. Federalism is
meant to be a compromise between the two.30

Thus, while recognizing the limited nature of federal power, Professor Scalia
encouraged conservatives to use such power to achieve conservative ends.
“When liberals are in power they do not shrink from using the federal structure
for what they consider to be sound governmental goals. But when
conservatives take charge, the most they hope to do is to keep anything from
happening.”31
Professor Scalia’s point was not that conservatives should disregard the
constitutional limits of federal power. Rather, he merely suggested that they
should use the federal government’s undisputed power in constructive ways.
For example, Professor Scalia cited “economic regulation” as “an area in
which it is clear that the Founding Fathers meant the federal government to
restrain the centrifugal tendencies of the states.”32 Professor Scalia specifically
mentioned the possibility of preempting burdensome local cable regulations in
order to implement a national free market policy.33 Such a proposal suggests
no hostility to constitutional federalism. As Professor Scalia emphasized:
I do not think the most dyed-in-the-wool anti-federalist among you would deny
that the federal government has power to establish the regulatory environment
for cable—which is, realistically, part of an interstate delivery system that
brings information and entertainment from the production studios of New York
and California to the individual home.34

In the end, what Professor Merrill regards as evidence of hostility to
federalism is, in reality, nothing more than a policy preference as to how the
federal government should exercise its limited constitutional power. The mere
fact that Professor Scalia urged federal protection of interstate cable operations
tells us nothing about his view of Congress’s power to prohibit local handgun
possession near schools35 or to commandeer state and local law enforcement
officers.36 Justice Scalia’s subsequent resolution of these questions in favor of
the states, however, is not surprising. In 1982, Professor Scalia expressly
rejected the “extreme” alternative of unlimited federal power and explained

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Scalia, supra note 28, at 21.
Id.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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that “[f]ederalism is meant to be a compromise between” the “autonomy . . . of
independent states” and the “uniformity . . . of one centralized government.”37
Fourth, Professor Merrill cites Justice Scalia’s refusal during his first year
on the Supreme Court to reconsider Hans v. Louisiana.38 In Welch v. Texas
Department of Highways and Public Transportation,39 Justice Scalia wrote:
I find both the correctness of Hans as an original matter, and the feasibility, if
it was wrong, of correcting it without distorting what we have done in tacit
reliance upon it, complex enough questions that I am unwilling to address
them in a case whose presentation focused on other matters.40

It is not surprising that Justice Scalia found “the correctness of Hans” to be a
difficult question necessitating full briefing and argument. Even the most
ardent proponent of constitutional federalism acknowledges that the immunity
recognized in Hans must find its justification in sources beyond the text of the
Eleventh Amendment. For present purposes, however, the important point is
that Justice Scalia resolved this question in favor of the states when it next
came before the Court in 1989—well before the 1994 fault line Professor
Merrill hypothesizes. Accordingly, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,41
Justice Scalia voted to reaffirm Hans both on the basis of “the original
meaning of the Constitution,” and as a matter of stare decisis.42
Justice Scalia’s resolution of this issue presents a serious “problem[] of
timing”43 for Professor Merrill’s thesis. As Merrill acknowledges, by 1989,
“Justice Scalia had undeniably crossed the Rubicon on whether Congress has
power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment under its Article I powers, a
proposition that forms one of the pillars of the federalism revolution of the
second Rehnquist Court.”44 This means that Justice Scalia embraced state
sovereign immunity at least five years before Professor Merrill hypothesizes
that a strategic actor in Justice Scalia’s position would have made such a move.
There is additional evidence that Justice Scalia was a strong proponent of
constitutional federalism throughout his tenure on the Supreme Court. For
example, in his first year on the Court, Justice Scalia dissented in Tyler Pipe
Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Department of Revenue,45 an otherwise
routine negative Commerce Clause case. In the most sustained and sweeping
challenge to the doctrine in modern times, Justice Scalia argued that the
negative Commerce Clause “drastically limits the States’ discretion” and “has
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Scalia, supra note 28, at 19.
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
483 U.S. 468 (1987).
Id. at 496 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
491 U.S. 1 (1989).
Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Merrill, supra note 1, at 617.
Id. at 618.
483 U.S. 232 (1987).
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no basis in the Constitution.”46 According to Justice Scalia, the text of the
Commerce Clause “is a charter for Congress, not the courts,” to ensure free
trade among the states.47 Justice Scalia observed that the “pre-emption of state
legislation would automatically follow, of course, if the grant of power to
Congress to regulate interstate commerce were exclusive.”48 Justice Scalia
rejected this reading, however, because unlike other provisions, “the language
of the Commerce Clause gives no indication of exclusivity,”49 and “there is no
correlative denial of power over commerce to the States in Art. I, § 10, as there
is, for example, with the power to coin money or make treaties.”50 Justice
Scalia also found that the “historical record provides no grounds” for the
negative Commerce Clause.51 After reviewing the ratification debates, Justice
Scalia thought “it beyond question that many ‘apprehensions’ would have been
‘entertained’ if supporters of the Constitution had hinted that the Commerce
Clause, despite its language, gave this Court the power it has since assumed.”52
The same year, in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates,
Inc.,53 Justice Scalia was the only Justice to refuse to borrow a federal statute
of limitations and apply it to civil RICO actions. Justice Scalia preferred to
follow the Court’s earlier “practice of borrowing state statutes,” which he
thought “in reality involved no borrowing at all.”54 Justice Scalia explained
that “state statutes of limitations whose terms appear to cover federal statutory
causes of action apply as a matter of state law to such claims,” and that
“imposition of limitations periods on federal causes of action is within the
States’ powers, if not preempted by Congress.”55
A few years later, in Tafflin v. Levitt,56 Justice Scalia urged the Court to
reconsider its earlier dictum suggesting that state courts could be deprived of
concurrent jurisdiction to hear federal claims even in the absence of an explicit
federal statutory command to that effect. According to Justice Scalia, “[s]tate
courts have jurisdiction over federal causes of action not because it is
‘conferred’ upon them by the Congress,” but because the laws of the United
46. Id. at 254 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. Id. at 260.
48. Id. at 260-61.
49. Id. at 261.
50. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc., 483 U.S. at 261.
51. Id. at 263.
52. Id. at 264. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, has also called on the Court to
abandon the negative Commerce Clause. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The negative Commerce Clause
has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually
unworkable in application.”).
53. 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
54. Id. at 158 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
55. Id. at 161.
56. 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
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States constitute the law of the land applicable in federal and state courts
alike.57 Thus, in Justice Scalia’s view, it “takes an affirmative act of power
under the Supremacy Clause” to deprive “state courts of their sovereign
authority to adjudicate the law of the land.”58 Cases like Tyler Pipe, MalleyDuff, and Tafflin demonstrate that, contrary to Professor Merrill’s assumption,
Justice Scalia arrived on the Court with a strong commitment to upholding the
states’ prerogatives under the original constitutional scheme.
Fifth, Professor Merrill points to Justice Scalia’s “voting record in
preemption cases” as “circumstantial evidence tending to suggest the strategic
nature of [his] behavior on constitutional federalism.”59 He argues that
a sincere federalist would not only support formal limits on congressional
power and immunities for states from suit by private citizens grounded in
federal law, but he or she would also want to interpret the preemptive effect of
federal statutes narrowly, so as to leave as large an ambit of state regulatory
authority as possible.60

Yet, in Professor Merrill’s view, Justice Scalia consistently supports “broad
interpretations of the preemptive scope of federal law.”61 Professor Merrill
erroneously equates a commitment to upholding the constitutional division of
power between the federal government and the states with an unyielding policy
preference for state and local control. As Professor Scalia’s 1982 speech to the
Federalist Society illustrates, however, the Constitution’s rejection of “one
centralized government”62 does not mean that the federal government should
hesitate to act in those areas in which “the Founding Fathers meant the federal
government to restrain the centrifugal tendencies of the states.”63
Even putting aside Professor Merrill’s false premise, his analysis of Justice
Scalia’s voting record in preemption cases suffers from significant
methodological flaws. Merrill argues that Justice Scalia is an insincere
federalist because in certain cases “Justice Scalia has supported federal
preemption, but either Chief Justice Rehnquist or Justice Thomas (both of
whom are more consistent supporters of states’ rights) have voted against a

57. Id. at 469-70 (Scalia, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 470. The Court effectively adopted Justice Scalia’s approach a few months later in
Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990). See Michael E. Solimine,
Rethinking Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 383, 385 (1991) (stating that “the
Court in Donnelly, perhaps influenced by Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Tafflin, seemed
more concerned with textual exegesis than with policy concerns in determining if the
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction was rebutted”).
59. Merrill, supra note 1, at 611.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Scalia, supra note 28, at 19.
63. Id. at 20.
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finding of preemption.”64 The cases that Professor Merrill cites, however,
could just as easily be characterized as evidence of Justice Scalia’s sincerity in
federalism cases. Thus, in most of these cases, Justice Scalia voted with either
Chief Justice Rehnquist or Justice Thomas—both sincere federalists according
to Professor Merrill. If either of these “sincere” federalists found preemption,
then there is no reason to question Justice Scalia’s motive in such cases.
Moreover, Professor Merrill does not take into account the votes of Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy. Few would question Justice O’Connor’s sincerity
when it comes to federalism,65 and Professor Merrill himself suggests that
Justice Kennedy may be a “more ardent states’ rights advocate[], at least
insofar as immunity from suit is concerned, than are” Justices O’Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas.66 Thus, it is significant that either Justice O’Connor, or
Justice Kennedy, or both, voted with Justice Scalia in almost every case that
Merrill cites.
Sixth, Professor Merrill notes that Justice Scalia issued no separate
concurring opinions “in the Court’s post-Lopez federalism decisions.”67
According to Merrill, this suggests that Justice Scalia “remains, at best,
uninterested in issues of constitutional federalism.”68 This conclusion simply
does not follow. Justices typically use separate concurring opinions to express
disagreement, however small, with the Court’s approach. Thus, the absence of
concurring opinions by Justice Scalia is much more likely to signal agreement
rather than disinterest. Consider the flag-burning cases, both of which were
close 5-4 decisions. In Texas v. Johnson69 and United States v. Eichman,70
Justice Scalia joined Justice Brennan’s majority opinions without writing
separately. Before being elevated to the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia was not
known for taking a particularly expansive view of the First Amendment.71 Yet
no reasonable observer would conclude that Justice Scalia’s failure to issue
separate opinions in the flag-burning cases indicates either disinterest in free
speech issues or insincerity in voting to invalidate the statutes at issue.
Seventh, Professor Merrill suggests that there is pronounced “tension
between the new federalism and Justice Scalia’s methodological
convictions.”72 For example, Professor Merrill asserts that “[b]oth the Tenth

64. Merrill, supra note 1, at 611-12 (emphasis added).
65. See id. at 608 n.142 and accompanying text (noting that Justice O’Connor had worked in
state government and been active in state politics).
66. Id. at 611 n.158.
67. Id. at 612.
68. Id.
69. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
70. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
71. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
72. Merrill, supra note 1, at 613.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

762

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:753

Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle and the extension of the Eleventh
Amendment to include actions in state court and before federal administrative
agencies lack any foundation in the text of the Constitution.”73 He regards this
as evidence of strategic voting because “[i]n other contexts, such as substantive
due process and the dormant Commerce Clause, Justice Scalia has been
scornful of judicial doctrines that have no perceived foundation in the
constitutional text.”74 Professor Merrill’s argument rests on the false
assumption that both sets of decisions require affirmative justification in the
constitutional text. The original Constitution and the Tenth Amendment,
however, suggest that the states retain all powers not prohibited to them by the
Constitution, and that the federal government possesses only those powers
“delegated to the United States by the Constitution.”75 Thus, doctrines
restricting state power (like substantive due process and the dormant
Commerce Clause) must be grounded in the text of the Constitution. Doctrines
upholding state autonomy from federal interference, by contrast, frequently
arise precisely because the Constitution is silent concerning the federal
government’s power to act.76
More fundamentally, Professor Merrill does not acknowledge that the text
of the Constitution often fails to address matters implicit in the constitutional
structure. As Charles Black explained, it would be “intellectually satisfying,”
but “not true,” to say that, for constitutional law, our legal culture “always
purports to move on the basis of the interpretation of particular constitutional
texts.”77 Although searching “the written text for its meaning in application to
the presented case”78 is the prevailing means of constitutional interpretation,
Professor Black demonstrated that “the method of inference from the structures
and relationships created by the constitution in all its parts or in some principal
part” also plays a significant role “in the development of our constitutional
law.”79 Thus, even when “there is no constitutional text speaking to th[e]
precise question,”80 the constitutional structure frequently suggests an answer.
Professor Merrill does not question Justice Scalia’s sincerity in relying on the
constitutional structure to decide separation of powers cases like Morrison v.
Olson.81 There is no greater reason for doing so when Justice Scalia invokes

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
76. See Bradford R. Clark, Translating Federalism: A Structural Approach, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1161, 1187-97 (1998).
77. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7-8
(1969).
78. Id. at 5.
79. Id. at 7-8.
80. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
81. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). See Merrill, supra note 1, at 605.
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the constitutional structure to decide federalism cases like Printz v. United
States.82
Professor Merrill finds additional tension between “the new federalism and
Justice Scalia’s methodological convictions” in several cases in which “the
Rehnquist majority has engaged in a close analysis of whether Congress has
made sufficient ‘findings’ to justify its exercise of legislative power” under the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.83 According
to Professor Merrill, this “process-based review entails an extensive foray into
legislative history and would seem to implicate all of the dangers of
illegitimacy and manipulation that Justice Scalia has cited in opposing the use
of legislative history to construe ambiguous statutes.”84
Here again, the “tension” that Professor Merrill identifies is more apparent
than real. As the Supreme Court made clear in United States v. Lopez,85
“Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the
substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce.”86 Although
Congress made no findings to support the statute invalidated in Lopez, the
Court suggested that such findings might be useful to the extent that they
“enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question
substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial
effect was visible to the naked eye.”87 Five years later, the Court confirmed
the limited role of congressional findings in United States v. Morrison.88 On
this occasion, Congress made findings that sex-based violence affects interstate
commerce, but the Court considered such findings insufficient to establish the
constitutionality of the statute in question.89
The Supreme Court’s limited use of congressional findings in Commerce
Clause cases is fully consistent with Justice Scalia’s reluctance to use
legislative history to determine the meaning of ambiguous statutory texts. At
most, the Court suggested that such findings might help the Court understand
why Congress thought a particular statute fell within its constitutional power to
enact. As Morrison demonstrates, however, congressional findings do not
relieve the Court of its independent obligation to ascertain the meaning of the
operative constitutional provisions. Textualists reject the use of legislative
history as authoritative evidence of statutory meaning.90 Properly understood,

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
(1997).

521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Merrill, supra note 1, at 613.
Id. at 614.
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Id. at 562.
Id. at 563.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Id. at 614-15.
See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673
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however, textualism “does not require the blanket exclusion of legislative
history from judicial consideration.”91 Rather, so long as courts do not use
legislative history to “give agents of Congress the power to ‘say what the law
is,’”92 such history “may add substantial value to the interpretive process by
supplying a well-informed, contemporaneous account of the relevant
background to the enactment.”93 Justice Scalia himself has relied on
legislative history for just this purpose.94 Such reliance is consistent with the
Rehnquist Court’s willingness to consider congressional findings for analogous
purposes in cases like Lopez and Morrison.
Eighth, Professor Merrill believes that “the content of the three states’
rights opinions [Justice Scalia] has been assigned to write for the five-Justice
majority”95 is “consistent with the hypothesis that Justice Scalia’s support for
the Rehnquist majority in these cases is strategic.”96 Although acknowledging
that such judgments are “necessarily subjective,” Professor Merrill’s
impression is that “these opinions reflect relatively little enthusiasm or
engagement with the immediate question at hand—constitutional
federalism.”97 For example, Professor Merrill characterizes Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Printz v. United States98 as “listless and defensive.”99 He maintains
that Scalia’s “otherwise wooden opinion becomes animated only when
discussing a structural reason for invalidating federal laws commandeering
state officers, namely, that this ‘shatter[s]’ the principle of the unitary
executive, thereby permitting Congress to reduce the power of the
President.”100
As an initial matter, I would dispute Professor Merrill’s characterization of
Justice Scalia’s opinion. It is true that Printz does not simply restate Justice
O’Connor’s “clear theory” of government accountability from New York v.
United States,101 which Professor Merrill apparently prefers. Justice Scalia,
however, makes a significant contribution to the doctrine in the “many pages”
that he spends “arguing against the proposition that the anti-commandeering
91. Id. at 732.
92. Id. at 731. Giving agents of Congress such power would undermine an important feature
of the constitutional structure. As John Manning has explained, “textualism should be understood
as a means of implementing a central and increasingly well-settled element of the separation of
powers—the prohibition against legislative self-delegation.” Id. at 675.
93. Id. at 732.
94. See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444 (1988) (relying on a Senate report to
confirm “[a] leading purpose” of the statute).
95. Merrill, supra note 1, at 614.
96. Id. at 617.
97. Id. at 614.
98. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
99. Merrill, supra note 1, at 614.
100. Id. at 615.
101. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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principle of New York is contrary to historical practice and understandings.”102
Professor Merrill disparages Justice Scalia’s reliance on “historical practice
and understanding,” but this inquiry is crucial in commandeering cases because
the constitutional text is silent on the matter.103 Thus, Justice Scalia’s focus on
history was not only appropriate, but essential, to proper resolution of the
question presented in Printz.
Professor Merrill also points to Justice Scalia’s reliance on other aspects of
the constitutional structure in Printz as evidence of strategic behavior. He
argues that Justice Scalia “attempt[ed] to re-ground the anti-commandeering
principle in the separation of powers doctrine of the unitary executive.”104 In
Professor Merrill’s view, such reliance on the separation of powers reveals
Justice Scalia’s “desire to use federalism cases to achieve other ends.”105
Professor Merrill’s argument rests on the false assumption that there is no
logical connection between the Constitution’s separation of powers and
federalism. In fact, many of the Supreme Court’s most significant separation
of powers decisions also safeguard federalism by preventing each branch of the
federal government from circumventing federal lawmaking procedures
designed to constrain federal action.106 Thus, if commandeering undermines
the federal separation of powers, then that conclusion constitutes crucial
evidence in determining whether the Constitution’s otherwise ambiguous
provisions affirmatively authorize Congress to commandeer the states.
Professor Merrill next cites Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v.
United States ex rel. Stevens107 as an example of Justice Scalia’s “desire to use
federalism cases to achieve other ends.”108 He states that the Court took the
case in order to resolve a circuit conflict over “whether the Eleventh
Amendment bars an action against a state by an individual bringing a qui tam
suit in the name of the United States.”109 After finding Article III standing,
however, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion avoided the Eleventh Amendment
question by interpreting the term “persons” in the False Claims Act not to

102. Merrill, supra note 1, at 615.
103. Clark, supra note 76, at 1195 (noting that with respect to commandeering “all potentially
relevant provisions of the constitutional text . . . are ambiguous in the sense that they neither
expressly confer nor expressly deny congressional power to take the challenged action”).
104. Merrill, supra note 1, at 615.
105. Id. Justice Scalia also relied on the unitary executive to deny standing in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). Using Professor Merrill’s reasoning, such reliance
would constitute evidence that Justice Scalia voted strategically to deny standing in order to
further a distinct separation of powers agenda.
106. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1321, 1326 (2001).
107. 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
108. Merrill, supra note 1, at 615.
109. Id.
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include states. Professor Merrill finds it telling that in so doing Justice Scalia
managed not to “say anything about federalism at all.”110
Professor Merrill fails to recognize, however, that the clear-statement
requirement employed in cases like Vermont Agency itself constitutes an
important doctrine designed to safeguard federalism. According to Justice
Scalia, the Court’s reading of the False Claims Act was buttressed by the rule
that “‘if Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between
States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’”111 In support of this
proposition, Justice Scalia cited Gregory v. Ashcroft,112 a case written by
Justice O’Connor and generally counted among the Rehnquist Court’s
significant federalism decisions. The clear-statement requirement applied in
such cases protects the governance prerogatives of the states by upholding state
law unless “Congress actually considered—and proceeded to enact into law—a
proposal that threatens state prerogatives.”113 In other words, the doctrine
ensures that the federal government incurs the decision costs imposed by
federal lawmaking procedures—costs designed in large measure to preserve
the states’ ability to govern their own affairs.114
III. SCALIA’S STRATEGY
Given that Professor Merrill’s “internal strategic actor” hypothesis lacks
meaningful support, one must look elsewhere to explain Justice Scalia’s
approach in federalism cases. Justice Scalia is an “originalist” when it comes
to constitutional interpretation. The original Constitution “establishes a
structure of government with two main features—federalism and separation of
powers.”115 Professor Merrill assumes that separation of powers and
federalism are mutually exclusive doctrines—that is, that commitment to one
somehow precludes enthusiasm for the other. The Founders, by contrast,
viewed these doctrines as mutually reinforcing features of the constitutional
structure designed to serve the same ends. As James Madison explained:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is
first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to
each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
security arises to the rights of the people.116

110. Id. at 616.
111. Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 787 (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 65 (1989)).
112. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
113. Clark, supra note 106, at 1427.
114. Id. at 1338-46.
115. Clark, supra note 76, at 1161.
116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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Justice Scalia supports federalism for the same reason that he embraces the
separation of powers. Both doctrines are integral parts of the original
constitutional plan to preserve individual liberty.117
Justice Scalia generally takes an “‘originalist’ approach to constitutional
interpretation.”118 This approach attempts “to establish the meaning of the
Constitution, in 1789,” by “examining various evidence, including not only, of
course, the text of the Constitution and its overall structure, but also the
contemporaneous understanding” of the Founders, the background reflected in
the English constitution, and the understanding revealed by “the various state
constitutions in existence when the federal Constitution was adopted.”119
Justice Scalia acknowledges both “that historical research is always difficult
and sometimes inconclusive,”120 and that “almost every originalist would
adulterate it with the doctrine of stare decisis.”121 In the end, however, Justice
Scalia concludes that originalism is “more compatible with the nature and
purpose of a Constitution in a democratic system” than nonoriginalism.122
Thus, if one seeks to predict Justice Scalia’s resolution of constitutional
questions, the best indicator is likely to be the original understanding of the
Constitution.
With respect to separation of powers, for example, Justice Scalia adheres
closely to the Founders’ view that “the preservation of liberty requires that the
three great departments of power should be separate and distinct.”123 The
Founders believed the legislative department to be the most dangerous threat to

117. Madison also linked federalism, separation of powers, and individual liberty at the
Virginia Convention:
Consider fully the principles of the Government. The sum of the powers given up by the
people of Virginia is divided into two classes. One to the Federal and the other to the
State Government. Each is subdivided in three branches. These may be kept independent
of each other in the one as well as the other. In this system they are as distinct as is
consistent with good policy. This, in my opinion, instead of diminishing, increases the
security of liberty more than any Government that ever was. For the powers of
Government which in every other country are given to one body, are here given to two;
and are favourable to public liberty.
Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 14, 1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1258, 1295 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds.,
1993).
118. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 851-52 (1989).
119. Id. at 852.
120. Id. at 864.
121. Id. at 861.
122. Id. at 862.
123. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See also
Agrippa XVI, MASS. GAZETTE, Feb. 5, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 863, 864 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino
eds., 1998) (“It is now generally understood, that it is for the security of the people, that the
powers of the government should be lodged in different branches.”).
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the constitutional separation of powers.
As Madison explained: “Its
constitutional powers being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of
precise limits, [the legislature] can, with greater facility, mask, under
complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the
co-ordinate departments.”124 Given this understanding, it should come as no
surprise that Justice Scalia has voted to invalidate congressional attempts to
usurp or interfere with the constitutional functions assigned to the executive
and judicial branches.
Two cases illustrate Justice Scalia’s approach. In Morrison v. Olson,125
Justice Scalia voted to invalidate the Independent Counsel statute because it
interfered with the President’s ability to control the execution of federal law.
In his now-classic dissent, Justice Scalia stressed that “[t]he purpose of the
separation and equilibration of powers in general, and of the unitary Executive
in particular, was not merely to assure effective government but to preserve
individual freedom.”126 Thus, he refused to go along with the majority’s “ad
hoc approach to constitutional adjudication,” preferring “to rely upon the
judgment of the wise men who constructed our system, and of the people who
approved it, and of two centuries of history that have shown it to be sound.”127
Similarly, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,128 Justice Scalia invalidated a
congressional attempt to reopen judicial judgments after they had become
final. Speaking on behalf of the Court, Justice Scalia explained that the
Founders “lived among the ruins of a system of intermingled legislative and
judicial powers,”129 and, therefore, crafted Article III to give “the Federal
Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them.”130
The Founders also believed that federalism—like separation of powers—
would safeguard liberty. As Alexander Hamilton explained:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at
all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and
these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The
people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it

124. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 310 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
125. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
126. Id. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 734. See also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (urging invalidation of binding sentencing “guidelines” promulgated by the United
States Sentencing Commission because there is “no place within our constitutional system for an
agency created by Congress to exercise no governmental power other than the making of laws”).
128. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
129. Id. at 219.
130. Id. at 218-19.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE SCALIA

769

preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the
other as the instrument of redress.131

Justice Scalia’s embrace of constitutional federalism is not only consistent
with, but affirmatively complements, his commitment to the separation of
powers. For example, in his first major federalism opinion in 1989, Justice
Scalia expressly tied state sovereign immunity to the preservation of individual
liberty. In an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor,
and Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia identified the principle of state sovereign
immunity as “an essential element of the constitutional checks and
Such immunity, he explained, serves to maintain the
balances.”132
“constitutionally mandated balance of power between the States and the
Federal Government” and thus implements the Founders’ intent “to ensure the
protection of our fundamental liberties.”133
Justice Scalia expressed these same themes again in Printz v. United
States,134 arguably his most significant federalism opinion on behalf of the
Supreme Court. Justice Scalia examined “the original understanding of the
Constitution”135 in order to determine whether Congress has constitutional
power to require state executive officers to implement federal commands.
After surveying the historical record, Justice Scalia examined “the structure of
the Constitution.”136 He began with the observation that “[a]lthough the States
surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they
retained ‘a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.’”137 Justice Scalia explained
that “[t]his separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution’s structural
protections of liberty.”138 Thus, permitting Congress to impress state executive
officers into federal service would threaten this feature of the constitutional

131. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Delegates to the state ratifying conventions expressed similar views. As one delegate explained:
Too much provision cannot be made against a consolidation [of the states]. The state
governments represent the wishes and feelings and local interests of the people. They are
the safe guard and ornament of the constitution—they will protract the period of our
liberties—they will afford a shelter against the abuse of power, and will be the natural
avengers of our violated rights.
Debates of the Massachusetts Convention (Jan. 19, 1788) (statement of Mr. Ames), in 6 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1254, 1256 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2000).
132. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 39 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
133. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
134. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
135. Id. at 910.
136. Id. at 918.
137. Id. at 918-19 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (J. Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
138. Id. at 921.
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structure—and, hence, individual liberty—by “immeasurably” augmenting the
power of the federal government at the expense of the states.139
Contrary to Professor Merrill’s reading,140 Printz reveals that Justice
Scalia—like the Founding generation—understood federalism and separation
of powers not as unrelated or contradictory doctrines, but as complementary
features of the constitutional structure designed to serve the same purpose: the
preservation of individual liberty. As he explained in Printz: “‘Just as the
separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.’”141
Justice Scalia expressly tied this understanding to that of the Founders by
quoting Madison’s “double security” passage from The Federalist.142
Given that Justice Scalia regards both separation of powers and federalism
as mechanisms for preserving individual liberty, it is perhaps not surprising
that he voted to reaffirm Hans v. Louisiana143 just one year after the Supreme
Court decided Morrison v. Olson.144 As discussed, Justice Scalia viewed the
Court’s decision in Morrison to uphold the Independent Counsel statute as
inconsistent with the Constitution’s separation of powers, and, hence, a threat
to individual liberty.145 As Professor Merrill points out, when Justice Scalia
first joined the Court in 1986, he seemed “genuinely dubitante on the issue” of
whether Hans should be overruled.146 Three years later, Justice Scalia resolved
any doubts by reference to “the original meaning of the Constitution” and stare
decisis.147 In voting to reaffirm Hans, Justice Scalia undoubtedly sought to
uphold the Constitution’s structural protection of individual liberty. Having
seen the Court disregard the separation of powers in Morrison just a year
earlier, Justice Scalia may have been especially eager to preserve federalism,
the other principal feature of the constitutional structure “adopted by the
Framers to ensure the protection of our fundamental liberties.”148

139. Printz, 521 U.S. at 922.
140. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
141. Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
142. Id. at 922. See supra text accompanying note 116.
143. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
144. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
145. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
146. Merrill, supra note 1, at 611.
147. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 34 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
148. Id. at 39 (internal quotations omitted).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia’s commitment to the original understanding of the
Constitution naturally leads him to embrace both federalism and separation of
powers. Each doctrine is an essential feature of the original constitutional plan
to prevent tyranny and safeguard individual liberty. Thus, it is entirely
foreseeable that Justice Scalia—a self-described originalist—would seek to
implement both features of the original constitutional structure. One might
legitimately question the correctness of Justice Scalia’s votes in particular
cases, but the record simply does not support Professor Merrill’s thesis that
these votes were not sincerely cast. By embracing both federalism and
separation of powers, Justice Scalia has simply attempted to uphold Madison’s
assurance that in “the compound republic of America,” “a double security
arises to the rights of the people.”149

149. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 12, at 291.
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